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CASENOTES
THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE TO CIVIL
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the United States prohibits the depriva-
tion of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'
The Constitution also expressly states that private property
may not be "taken" by the government without "just compensa-
tion."2 Seizures and forfeitures of personal and real property
without notification or hearing and without compensation have,
however, become a powerful tool used by the government to
deter crime.'
Both historic common law and modern law distinguish be-
tween criminal and civil forfeiture; the former is a proceeding
against the person, and the latter is a proceeding brought
against property.4 Upon the occurrence of an act specified by
statute, property used in or connected with that act is forfeit-
ed.5 The forfeiture is immediate, "and a conditional right to the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
3. See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926); Dobbins's Dis-
tillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
4. In rem jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate claims against property or res.
See generally 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 1.01[3] (2d ed.
1991 & Supp. 1996). Personal jurisdiction over the owner of the property is not re-
quired for the application of in rem jurisdiction. See id. In personam jurisdiction is
the power to bind a person or adjudicate an action involving the person. See general-
ly id- § 1.01[2].
5. See United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195
n.1 (C.D. CaL 1978).
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property then vests in the government."6 The property owner
does not have to be convicted and is not named as a party to
the action.! This tool would surely be unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the innocent owner if it were not for the courts' contin-
ued reliance on the common-law fiction of "guilty property."8
Under this rationale, the relevant question in a forfeiture pro-
ceeding is whether the property, and not the property owner, is
guilty or innocent.9 The guilty property rationale has enabled
the courts to look past the constitutional protections traditional-
ly afforded to individuals.'0 Forfeiture of property used in con-
nection with criminal activity serves as a deterrent, and pre-
vents illegal uses of property by preventing further illicit use
and imposing economic penalties on the owner." Forfeiture of
an innocent owner's property is justified on the basis that the
owner may be held accountable for the wrongs of others to
whom he entrusts his property.' This, in turn, induces inno-
cent owners to exercise greater care in transferring possession
of property.' When, however, the owner of property has no
knowledge and has taken reasonable precautions against the il-
licit use of his property, the government's objective of deter-
rence is arguably inapplicable.' 4 The innocent owner defense to
forfeitures has become an important issue to courts that have
struggled with the impact of taking a person's property despite
6. Id.
7. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-84 (quoting
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827)).
8. At common law, there were three kinds of forfeiture recognized: escheat upon
attainder, deodand, and statutory forfeiture. Only statutory forfeiture is recognized
today. Escheat upon attainder was based upon the premise that the sovereign re-
tained a superior interest in the property. Deodand was premised upon the idea that
the property itself, regardless of the conduct of its owner, could be guilty of commit-
ting a crime. This is where the concept of guilty property has its roots. See, e.g., Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505
(1921); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
9. At common law, it was recognized that the guilty object was the defendant,
and that the property owner's guilt or innocence was not a defense. See The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14. "The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or
rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing." Id.
10. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
465 (1926); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
11. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 687.
12. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 404.
13. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
14. See id. at 689-90.
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guilt or innocence. In 1996 the Supreme Court had the opportu-
nity to re-examine the innocent owner defense to forfeiture
proceedings in Bennis v. Michigan."
In 1995, Tina Bennis' husband, John, used their jointly
owned car to pick up a prostitute in a Detroit suburb.16 A po-
lice officer saw him engaged in a sex act in the car." Mr.
Bennis was subsequently arrested and convicted of gross inde-
cency.18 Michigan sought forfeiture of the car under an abate-
ment statute.' Mrs. Bennis unsuccessfully fought the forfei-
ture of her interest in the car by arguing that she had no
knowledge of Mr. Bennis' use of the car to violate Michigan
law.20
The question before the Supreme Court was "whether
Michigan's abatement scheme... deprived [Tina Bennis] of
her interest in the forfeited car without due process, in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, or [took] her interest for
public use without compensation, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment."2'
This casenote examines the Court's rejection of the innocent
owner defense in Bennis v. Michigan, and the effect its decision
will have on the future use of the defense to seizure and forfei-
ture cases. Part II discusses the historical evolution of the inno-
cent owner defense. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's
modern analysis of the innocent owner defense. Part IV intro-
duces the facts and the procedural history of Bennis and ex-
plains the reasoning of the Court and the dissent. Part V ana-
15. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
16. See id. at 996.
17. See id.
18. See MIcH CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.338(b) (West 1991); Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at
996.
19. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.3825 (West 1987). The statute provides, in
relevant part,
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is estab-
lished in an action as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement
shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the case ... (2), Vehicles,
sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a nuisance
within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order and
judgment as any furniture, fixtures and contents as herein provided.
IcL
20. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
21. Id. at 997-98.
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lyzes the Court's conclusion that forfeiture of a vehicle, used for
illicit purposes without the knowledge of one of the owners, was
valid under both the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Part
VI concludes by examining the impact this decision will have
on the future of the innocent owner defense.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INNOCENT
OWNER DEFENSE
A. Introduction
Civil forfeiture statutes and the notion of "guilty property"
can be historically traced to three types of forfeiture recognized
at English common law: escheat upon attainder, deodand and
statutory forfeiture.' Escheat upon attainder was applied as a
criminal penalty in personam; its primary rationale was punish-
ment of property owners who have committed crimes." Under
this doctrine, the sovereign had a superior interest in all prop-
erty; if a person committed a capital offense like treason or a
felony, the interest in his property reverted back to the sover-
eign.' The doctrine of deodand was an in rem proceeding, pro-
viding that any object which caused the death of a King's sub-
ject was forfeited to the Crown.' The money gained from the
forfeited property was used for prayer services for the dece-
dent.26 The doctrine of deodand dates to pre-biblical times'
and was premised on the idea that property could be guilty of a
crime despite the owner's guilt or innocence.' Unlike escheat
upon attainder, the doctrine of deodand was intended to punish
the property, not the property owner.2" Forfeiture by statute
22. See Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When Is
Everything Too Much?, 53 U. Pirr. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1991).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).
26. See id.
27. See id, Exodus 21:28 ("If an ox gores a man or a woman and they die, then
the ox shall be stoned and his flesh not eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be
quit.").
28. See Lawrence A. Kasten, Note, Extending Constitutional Protection to Civil
Forfeitures That Exceed Rough Remedial Compensation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 194,
198-99 (1991) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *300-02).
29. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993) (recognizing that deo-
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was essentially a statutory version of deodand.5 0 Under this
doctrine, a statute provided for the forfeiture of property used
in violation of customs and revenue laws."' The only require-
ment was in rem jurisdiction, and like the doctrine of deodand,
there was no requirement that the property owner be found
guilty of any crime. 2
Each of these doctrines has contributed to modern forfeiture
statutes; however, only statutory forfeiture is still recognized in
the United States.' The modern notion of guilty property has
its roots in these common-law doctrines, specifically forfeiture
by statute and its predecessor, the doctrine of deodand.' The
rationales proposed by each is important when analyzing the
innocent owner defense to forfeitures, since the Supreme Court
has consistently used these doctrines as a basis for upholding
the constitutionality of civil forfeiture statutes.35
B. The Innocent Owner Defense in the United States: The
Palmyra and Malek Adhel
The innocent owner defense to forfeiture proceedings in the
United States can be traced back to The Palmyra6 and Har-
mony v. United States.37 In both of these early cases the Su-
preme Court upheld forfeitures of property despite the property
owner's guilt or innocence.'
dand served, at least in part, to punish the negligence of the owner).
30. See Robert Lieske, Civil Forfeiture Law: Replacing The Common Law With A
Common Sense Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 21
WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 265, 276 (1993).
31. See Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs,
83 CRIi. L. & CRImINOLOGY 274, 295 (1992).
32. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
33. See id. at 682-83.
34. See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926).
35. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
465 (1926); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
36. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
37. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). Harmony is frequently cited as United States v.
Brig Malek Adhel.
38. In The Palmyra the Supreme Court held that guilt to the property is not con-
tingent upon the owner's innocence or guilt. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). In Harmo-
ny, the Court sustained the condemnation of a ship pursuant to a federal forfeiture
statute despite conceding that the owner was not guilty of any crime. 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210 (1844).
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In The Palmyra, decided in 1827, the Supreme Court upheld
the forfeiture of a ship under a federal forfeiture law.39 The
Palmyra, ostensibly cruising under a commission as a privateer
by the King of Spain, was used to commit acts of piracy against
other ships." The vessel was captured by a United States war
ship and was taken into Charleston, South Carolina for adjudi-
cation.4 The circuit court acquitted the Palmyra and restored
the ship to its claimants without damages.' An appeal was
interposed to the Supreme Court on behalf of the United
States.' The owner of the Palmyra argued that the vessel
could not be forfeited unless he was convicted of privateering."
After discussing its common-law roots, the Supreme Court stat-
ed that under forfeitures created by statute, the offender's guilt
was not a prerequisite to forfeiture.' In reversing the circuit
court, Justice Story stated that "[t]he thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached
primarily to the thing."' The Court conceded that the owner
39. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 6-8 (1827) (discussing the Piracy Act of
1819, ch. 75, 3 Stat. 510, 513, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 384 (1988)). The
second section of the Piracy Act authorized the president to,
instruct the commanders of public armed vessels of the United States, to
seize, subdue, and send into any port of the United States, any armed
vessel or boat, or any vessel or boat, the crew whereof shall be armed,
and which shall have attempted or committed any piratical aggression,
search, restraint, depredation or seizure, upon any vessel of the United
States, or of the citizens thereof, or upon any other vessel.
Id at 8 (quoting the Piracy Act, ch. 75, § 2).
The fourth section of the Piracy Act stated that
whenever any vessel or boat from which any piratical aggression, search,
restraint, depredation, or seizure, shall have been first attempted or
made, shall be captured and brought into any port of the United States,
the same shall and may be adjudged and condemned to their use, and
that of the captors, after due process and trial, in any Court having
admiralty jurisdiction, and which shall be holden for the district into
which such captured vessel shall be brought, and the same Court shall
thereupon order a sale be brought, and the same Court shall thereupon
order a sale and distribution thereof accordingly, and at their discretion.
Id. (quoting the Piracy Act, ch. 75, § 4).
40. See id. at 8.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 9.
44. See id. at 12.
45. See id. at 14-15.
46. Id. at 14. "[Tjhe practice has been, and so this Court understand [sic] the law
to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by
262
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of the Palmyra was blameless; however, it found that culpabili-
ty was not relevant when applying the guilty property fiction.47
-In Harmony, decided in 1844, a ship commanded by an in-
sane captain had fired at other ships, and was seized by a
United States war vessel.' The ship and its cargo were con-
demned pursuant to a statutory forfeiture act.49 The owners
contested the proceedings, relying on the argument that they
had never contemplated or authorized the actions of the captain
or the crew.5" Although the Court conceded that the
shipowner's innocence was "fully established,"5 the statutory
forfeiture of the vessel was sustained.2 Justice Story explained
that the vessel which committed the acts of aggression is treat-
ed as the offender to which forfeiture attaches, apart from the
guilt or innocence of the owner." The guilty property fiction,
the Court reasoned, "is not an uncommon course ... to treat
the vessel in which.., a wrong or offence has been done as
the offender, without regard whatsoever to the personal miscon-
duct or responsibility of the owner thereof." "4
The Palmyra and Harmony illustrate the Court's early reli-
ance on the English common law and the guilty property fic-
tion." In The Palmyra, the Court laid the foundation for the
modern notion of the guilty property fiction.5 That reasoning
any criminal proceeding in personam." Id at 15.
47. See i&
48. See 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 230.
49. See id. at 231.
50. See id. at 230.
51. Id. at 238.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 233.
The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender,
as the guilty instrument or the thing to which the forfeiture attaches,
without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the own-
er. The vessel or boat (says the act of Congress) from which such pirati-
cal aggression... shall have been first attempted or made shall be




56. At common law, it was recognized that the guilty object was the defendant
and that the property owner's guilt or innocence was not a defense. The Palmyra, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14. "The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or
rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing." Id.
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resurfaced in Harmony, where the Court justified its continued
reliance on the guilty property fiction by pointing to its histori-
cal acceptance.57 The Court has relied heavily on this rationale
to reject the innocent owner defense to forfeitures for over a
century.'
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S MODERN ANALYSIS OF THE
INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE
A. Introduction
A discussion of cases beginning in 1921 with Goldsmith v.
United States59 provides a comprehensive framework to suffi-
ciently understand the Court's rationale for its decision in
Bennis. The guilty property fiction and its predecessors, the
doctrines of escheat upon attainder and deodand, play an inte-
gral part in the Court's modern analysis. When analyzing the
following cases, two important questions may prove useful to
the reader: (1) What is the connection or nexus between the
property forfeited and the illegal act?" and (2) Did the owner-
consent to the use of the property?
1. Goldsmith v. United States61
In Goldsmith, the Court upheld a federal statute permitting
forfeiture of a seller's interest in a car misused by a buyer.62
The Grant Company was the owner in fee simple of a car
which it sold, retaining title until full payment was made, to a
purchaser who used it to transport bootleg spirits." Under a
federal statute, the car was forfeited, and the Grant Company
lost title to the vehicle." The Grant Company argued that the
57. See 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233-34.
58. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663
(1974); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
59. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
60. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
62. See id. at 511.
63. See id at 508.
64. See id. at 508-09 (citing the Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 93, 157,
264 [Vol. 31:257
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forfeiture violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of
law because the statute was not to be construed to forfeit the
title of an innocent owner, but only the interest of the wrongdo-
er.6" Justice McKenna announced that although the statute
seemed "to violate that justice which should be the foundation
of the due process of law required by the Constitution...
there are other and militating considerations."6 He noted that
such seemingly unjust occurrences are in part owing to the
negligence of the owner upon whom Congress interposes respon-
sibility in aid of the prohibitions of the law." Justice McKenna
declared that forfeiture actions such as the one at issue are "too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the
country to be now displaced."' The Court in this early deci-
sion was content to rely on the common-law fiction of guilty
property69 to rationalize its decision.0 When faced with the
argument that a scheme of this nature had no limits, the Court
reserved the question of whether the guilty property fiction
could be used to forfeit the property of a truly innocent own-
er. 1 Justice McKenna stated that the Court had not had the
opportunity to deal with that issue, but "[wihen such applica-
tion shall be made it will be time enough to pronounce upon
it."
7 2
repealed by U.S. Rev. Stat. 2d § 3450 (1878) repealed by L.LC. § 7301(a) (West
1996)). The Federal statute stated that "[whenever any goods or commodities for or
in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed, ... are removed, or are deposited
or concealed in any place, with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, or
any part thereof, all such goods or commodities .... shall be forfeited .. . ." Id.
65. See Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 509.
66. Id. at 510.
67. See id. "In breaches of revenue provisions some forms of property are facili-
ties, and therefore it may be said, that Congress interposes the care and responsibili-
ty of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the law. . . ." Id
68. Id. at 511.
69. At common law, it was recognized that the guilty object was the defendant
and that the property owner's guilt or innocence was not a defense. The Palmyra, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14 (1827). "The thing is here primarily considered as the offender,
or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing . " Id.
70. See Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 510-12.
71. See id. at 512.
72. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:257
2. Van Oster v. Kansas3
In Van Oster, the Court was confronted with a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to a Kansas law which authorized forfei-
ture of a vehicle used in the illegal transportation of liquor.'
Van Oster purchased a car from a dealer, but allowed the deal-
er to retain possession.75 The dealer subsequently allowed the
car to be used to transport liquor. 6 Van Oster argued that the
dealer transported the liquor without her knowledge or authori-
ty.7 The Supreme Court of Kansas construed the law as au-
thorizing forfeiture of the interest of an innocent owner or lien-
or in property entrusted to the wrongdoer. 8 In his opinion up-
holding the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas, Justice
Stone explained that the law does not attempt to inquire about
collusion between a wrongdoer and an innocent owner.7 Rely-
ing on Goldsmith, the Court stated that because Van Oster had
entrusted and consented to the dealer's use of the car, there
was no innocent owner defense. The Court held that the state,
in the exercise of its police power, could determine that certain
uses of property were undesirable; judicial inquiry into the guilt
of the owner was not necessary."0
The rules put forth in Goldsmith and Van Oster indicate the
Court's unwillingness to allow a defense based upon lack of
knowledge or culpability. The Court relies on the guilty proper-
ty fiction, and in both cases justifies this reliance on its histori-
cal acceptance. The "nexus" between the instrumentality and
the crime was the vehicles' use to transport the illicit items.
Although the cars were not considered contraband, they served
as means to facilitate illicit activity. After Goldsmith and Van
73. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
74. KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2162 to -2167 (1919) (authorizing forfeiture of
vehicles used in illegal transportation of liquor).
75. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465.
76. See id. at 465-66.
77. See id. at 466.
78. See State v. Brown, 241 P. 112, 113 (Kan. 1925), affd sub nom. Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
79. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467. "It is not unknown or indeed uncommon for
the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unau-
thorized action of one to whom he has intrusted it." Id.
80. See id.
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Oster, the question still remained whether the guilty property
fiction could be used to forfeit the property of an owner who
was in no way negligent.
B. Stare Decisis and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
CO.81
In Calero-Toledo, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Puerto Rican government's seizure, without compensation,
of a yacht that was owned by a party who had neither knowl-
edge nor reason to know of any statutory violation.82 The plea-
sure yacht, owned by Pearson Yacht Leasing Company and
leased to Puerto Rican residents, was seized pursuant to the
Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico after marijuana was
found aboard the vessel.' The district court, relying upon
Fuentes v. Shevin," held that the act was unconstitutional be-
cause it failed to provide for pre-seizure notice or hearing, and
deprived persons of property without just compensation.'
In dispensing with the due process claim, Justice Brennan
noted that Fuentes "reafirmed, however, that, in limited cir-
cumstances, immediate seizure of a property interest, without
an opportunity for prior hearing, is constitutionally permissi-
ble." 8 Seizure under the Act did not deny due process because
seizure permitted the government to assert in remjurisdiction
81. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
82. See id. at 663.
83. See id- at 665.
84. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment re-
plevin provisions work a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as
they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from
their possessor).
85. See Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (1973),
rev'd sub nom. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
86. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678.
Such circumstances are those in which "the seizure has been di-
rectly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public
interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate
force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official
responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn
statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance."
Id (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972)).
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over the property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings.'
Justice Brennan concluded that the yacht was mobile and could
easily be destroyed or hidden, thus immediate seizure was
necessary and proper."
Justice Brennan then found that the Act did not unconstitu-
tionally authorize the taking for government use of innocent
parties' property without just compensation."9 Noting that the
innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has
almost uniformly been rejected as a defense, Justice Brennan
reaffirmed the notion set forth in Goldsmith and Van Oster that
the property was considered the wrongdoer.0 The Court stated
that, although severe, the fiction of "guilty property" helps to
prevent further illicit use of the conveyance and may cause
innocent owners to exercise greater care in transferring pos-
session of their property.9
Quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Peisch v. Ware, 2 the
Court implied that an owner whose property was taken without
his consent, or who was unaware and had taken reasonable
care to prevent illicit use of the property, may have a constitu-
tional defense to a forfeiture proceeding." Justice Brennan
87. See idJ at 679.
88. See id
89. See id. at 690.
90. See id at 685.
91. See id. at 686.
92. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808). "[A] forfeiture can only be applied to those
cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may
be employed." Id. at 363. In Peisch, a ship was wrecked and salvors carried off its
cargo. See id. at 359. The United States sought forfeiture of the cargo by charging
failure to pay duties on distilled spirits and removal of spirits from the tax collector
before assessment. See id. at 360-62. The Supreme Court held that forfeiture was
impermissible because the ship's owners were unable to comply with the customs law
regarding importation, since the crew had deserted the ship before landing, and the
vessel could not be brought into port. See id. at 362-63. The Court held that forfei-
ture is inappropriate when the means to prevent the violation cannot be carried out.
See id. at 363.
93. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the
constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture
had been taken from him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the
same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was unin-
volved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had
done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use
of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude
268
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distinguished Calero-Toledo, however, by explaining that in
Calero-Toledo the property was voluntarily entrusted to the
wrongdoer, then used in a manner inconsistent with that
consent.94
After the Calero-Toledo decision, there remained a strong
argument for the innocent owner defense only if the property
was taken without the owner's consent or the owner had no
knowledge of the offense and had taken aff ative precautions
to prevent misuse. This test left an owner who merely had no
knowledge of the offense or gave no consent to the illicit use
with no defense.95 Calero-Toledo's reliance on the guilty prop-
erty fiction, in combination with its extremely narrow innocent
ownership test, was used by courts to reject the innocent own-
ership defense to forfeiture cases for nearly two decades.96
C. Forfeiture as Punishment; Eighth Amendment Limits: Austin
v. United States
97
In Austin, the United States sought forfeiture of a mobile
home and a body shop after the owner pleaded guilty to violat-
ing South Dakota's drug laws.98 The government alleged that
Austin brought cocaine from his mobile home to his body shop
in order to consummate a pre-arranged sale of drugs.' Under
the United States Code, real property used to facilitate the sale
of drugs is subject to forfeiture.' 0 Austin challenged the stat-
that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
I& (citations omitted).
94. See id at 690.
95. See J. Kelly Stader, Taking the Wind Out of the Government's Sails: Forfei-
tures and Just Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 449, 492 (1996).
96. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
97. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
98. See id. at 605.
99. See id
100. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a) (4), (7) (1970). The statutes provide, in relevant part,
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale receipt, possession, or concealment of
[controlled substances, their raw materials, and equipment used in their
manufacture and -distribution] .... (7) All real property, including any
right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of
any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which
is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
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ute under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.1"'
The Eighth Circuit, relying on Calero-Toledo, rejected Austin's
claim, holding that the Constitution does not require propor-
tionality in civil forfeiture proceedings." 2
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision reversing the
Eighth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment extends to civil
proceedings where fines are intended to punish.' Justice
Blackmun explained that the common-law fiction of guilty prop-
erty rests on the notion that the owner has been negligent and
that he is properly punished for the negligence.' The Court
recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish,
thus the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause
applies.0 5 Finding that forfeiture is a form of monetary pun-
ishment, Justice Blackmun rejected the underlying assumption
in Calero-Toledo that civil forfeiture operates only against prop-
erty.'O He explained that had forfeiture not been understood
to punish the owner, there would have been no reason in
Calero-Toledo to reserve the case of a truly innocent owner."
However, the Court declined to establish a test for determining
whether a forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive, leaving this
question for the lower courts to consider.0 8
The Court rejected the Government's argument that the real
property in Austin was an "instrument" of the drug trade."°
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment ....
Id.
101. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 606. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
102. United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (1992), rev'd sub
nom. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
103. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
104. See id. at 612.
105. See id at 618; see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)
(noting that "[a] civil sanction that cannot be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,
but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent pur-
poses, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term").
106. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
107. See id. at 617. Recent cases have expressly reserved the question of whether
the guilty property fiction could be used to forfeit the property of a truly innocent
owner. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
108. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
109. See i&L at 620. Under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7), real property is forfeitable if it
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Justice Blackmun found that the attempt to characterize the
property as an instrument of the drug trade was too tenu-
ous."' In his concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that the
relevant "instrumentality" inquiry is the "relationship of the
property to the offense: Was it close enough to render the prop-
erty, under traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeit-
able?""' It is important to note that in Austin, the Court
again relied on precedent which employed the common-law
fiction of guilty property."
IV. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN"3
A. Introduction
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bennis v.
Michigan, the state of the law was defined by a long line of
cases culminating with Calero-Toledo and Austin."" The re-
strictions on the scope of forfeitures as applied to innocent
owners had evolved from a very deferential standard of review
based upon the holding of Calero-Toledo, to a seemingly new
vulnerability that arose under the Eighth Amendment in Aus-
tin."5 In the same year as the Austin decision, the Court in
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property"6 held that
the Government's ex parte action to seize Good's property was a
violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. However,
is used or intended for use to facilitate the commission of a drug-related crime.
110. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620.
111. See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring).
112. See id. at 616-17 (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1921)).
113. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
114. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 624.
115. See id. at 2803, 2806 (holding that criminal and civil forfeitures are subject to
the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause).
116. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993). In James Daniel Good, the Government filed an in rem
action against Good's home based upon a 1985 drug conviction. See id. at 497. It is
important to note that the Government had nearly five years in which to move for
forfeiture under the statute. See id. Good claimed that the seizure violated his Fifth
Amendment right to due process. See id. at 498. The Court found that there were no
exigent circumstances to support the government's ex parte action to seize the proper-
ty. See id. at 505. Under the Fifth Amendment the Court found a requirement to
notify Good of the forfeiture action and to permit him a hearing on the matter. See
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unlike Calero-Toledo, in James Daniel Good there were no
exigent circumstances to support a forfeiture without notice or
hearing. Additionally, in 1994, the Court ruled that civil forfei-
tures are subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."7 Bennis v. Michigan was viewed by proponents
of the innocent owner defense as the next big step by the Court
toward protecting the property of the innocent owner.
B. Facts and Procedural History
Tina Bennis and John Bennis were joint owners of a car in
which John Bennis engaged in sexual activity with a prosti-
tute." Michigan law states that any vehicle used for prostitu-
tion is declared a nuisance and shall be abated." After John
Bennis was convicted of gross indecency, the county prosecutor
filed a complaint alleging that the car was a nuisance subject
to abatement.' Tina Bennis argued that Michigan's abate-
ment scheme had taken her property for public use without
compensation; relying on the innocent owner test in Calero-
Toledo, she argued that she was entitled to contest the abate-
ment by showing that she did not know that her husband
117. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1944-45 (1994). In
Kurth Ranch, a family growing marijuana on their ranch was arrested and charged
with drug offenses. See id. at 1942. The Kurths were forced to give up equipment
and cash under a forfeiture action permitted by Montana law. See id. The Montana
Department of Revenue then moved to assess the Kurths with a tax on the danger-
ous drugs. See id. at 1942-43. The Supreme Court found the tax to be more than
400% of the market value of the drugs. See id. at 1947 n.17. The Court found that
tax unreasonably high and further found the tax to be criminal. See id. at 1948. Two
of the Kurths were incarcerated and subject to forfeiture. See, id. at 1942. The state
action of the additional tax resulted in punishing the defendants twice for the same
crime. See id. at 1948. The Court held the tax to be a violation of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id
118. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
119. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1995). The statute pro-
vides in relevant part:
Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose
of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept
for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons . . . is declared a
nuisance.., and all... nuisances shall be erjoined and abated as
provided in this act and as provided in court rules.
I1.
120. See Bennis, 116 5. Ct. at 996.
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would use the car to violate Michigan law." Using its reme-
dial discretion, the trial court declared the car forfeited as a
public nuisance, permitting no offset for Tina Bennis' interest,
and entered an order of abatement.'22 The court of appeals
held that, irrespective of the statute's language, Michigan case
law interpreting the section compelled reversal.'23 The Michi-
gan Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the abatement in
its entirety.' Relying on the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Van Oster and Calero-Toledo, the Michigan
Supreme Court found that the statute's failure to provide an
innocent owner defense was "without constitutional conse-
quence."'
C. The Majority Opinion
In a five-four decision affirming the Michigan Supreme Court,
Justice Rehnquist relied on the proposition put forth in Gold-
smith, seventy-five years before, that there is a distinction be-
tween the situation in which a vehicle is used without consent
of the owner, and one in which "although the owner consented
to [another person's] use, [the vehicle] is used in a manner to
which the owner did not consent."' Justice Rehnquist found
that a long history of cases holding that an owner's interest in
property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the
property is put, despite the owner's lack of knowledge, com-
pelled rejection of the due process claim.'27 He reviewed the
Court's decision in Calero-Toledo and noted that Tina Bennis
was in the "same position as the various owners involved in the
121. See id. at 997.
122. See id.
123. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Bennis, 504
N.W.2d 731, 733 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
124. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutors v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483,
487 (Mich. 1994).
125. See id. at 494.
126. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
127. See id. at 997. Justice Rehnquist explained that the Court's earliest opinion to
this effect was Justice Story's opinion in The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827),
where the Court explained that the thing is primarily considered as the offender.
Justice Rehnquist then reviewed Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), and Gold-
smith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921), drawing the same conclusion. See id.
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forfeiture cases beginning with The Palymra in 1827." '
Calero-Toledo's proposition that a defense may be available to
an owner who had taken reasonable steps to prevent illicit use
was not applicable to Mrs. Bennis.' Justice Rehnquist stated
that Tina Bennis made no showing beyond the Calero-Toledo
holding that the interest of an owner could be forfeited even
though the owner had no knowledge that his property was
being used in connection with the violation."3
Tina Bennis relied on Foucha v. Louisiana"3 for the propo-
sition that a criminal defendant may not be punished for a
crime if he is found not guilty; thus, the State must demon-
strate a punitive interest in depriving her of her interest in the
forfeited car.'32 In Foucha, the Court held that a defendant
found not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal trial could
not be confined without a showing that he was either danger-
ous or mentally ill.s Putting aside the question whether for-
feiture is punishment, Justice Rehnquist explained that Foucha
"did not purport to discuss, let alone overrule, the Palmyra line
of cases.""8
Next, the Court addressed Tina Bennis' claim that the forfei-
ture of her interest in the automobile was punitive.' She ar-
gued that the Supreme Court's decision in Austin "would be
128. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
129. See id at 999.
And the holding of Calero-Toledo... was that the interest of a yacht rental
company in one of its leased yachts could be forfeited because of its use for transpor-
tation of controlled substances, even though the company was 'in no way... in-
volved in ... its property... being used in connection with or in violation of [the
law].' Petitioner has made no showing beyond that here." Id (quoting Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 (1974)).
130. See id.
131. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). In Foucha, Justice White concluded that the Louisiana
statute violated the Due Process Clause because it allowed the defendant to be com-
mitted to a mental hospital until he demonstrated that he was not a danger to him-
self or others. See id. at 78-79. The Court rationalized that the State's basis for hold-
ing Foucha disappeared once the State conceded that he was not mentally ill at the
time of the trial court's hearing. See id. at 79. The Court stated that "[a]lthough a
State may imprison convicted criminals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution,
Louisiana has no such interest here, since Foucha was not convicted and may not be
punished." Id. at 72.
132. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000; Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
133. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71.
134. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
135. See id.
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difficult to reconcile with any rule allowing truly innocent per-
sons to be punished by civil forfeiture."" The Court distin-
guished Austin by noting that "[t]here was no occasion in that
case to deal with the validity of the 'innocent-owner defense'
other than to point out that if a forfeiture statute allows such a
defense, the defense is additional evidence that the statute
itself is 'punitive' in motive." 7 Justice Rehnquist stated that
the forfeiture in this case serves both a deterrent and punitive
purpose, but he noted that the trial judge has discretion under
Austin to consider alternatives to abatement.'
Justice Rehnquist then addressed Tina Bennis' claim under
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.39 The Court easily
found that if the forfeiture proceeding was not a violation of
due process, the property in the automobile was transferred by
virtue of that proceeding from Tina Bennis to the State of
Michigan.' Justice Rehnquist concluded that the government
is not required to compensate an owner for property which it
has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmen-
tal authority, other than under the power of eminent do-
main.14 1
D. The Concurring Opinions
Justices Thomas and Ginsburg each wrote concurring opin-
ions.' Justice Thomas explained that the "Federal Constitu-
tion does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesir-
able."' He stated that the facts of this case do not seem ob-
viously distinguishable from Van Oster, and "[i]f anything, the
136. Id.
137. Id In Austin the court held that forfeiture proceedings are subject to the
limits of the Eighth Amendments prohibition against excessive fines. Austin, 509 U.S.
602, 618 (1993).
138. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
139. See id. at 1001.
140. See id.
141. See id. The government may not be required to compensate an owner for
property which it has already lawfully acquired. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S.
488 (1973); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
142. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001, 1003 (Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
143. Id. at 1001-02 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 438 (1993)).
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forfeiture in Van Oster was harder to justify than is the forfei-
ture here, albeit in a different respect."' 4
Justice Thomas then discussed his concerns with what it
means to "use" property for purposes of forfeiture law.' He
stated that the limits defining what can be forfeited as a result
of wrongdoing should be strictly applied, adhering to historical
standards.' Those limits are the "sole restrictions on the
state's ability to take property from those it merely suspects, or
does not even suspect, of colluding in crime."'47 In any event,
Justice Thomas wrote, Mrs. Bennis had not asserted that the
car was not an instrumentality of her husband's illicit act."
He then explained that the state's action in selling the car was
remedial, as indicated by the trial judge's statement that there
would be little left over after costs."49 Because this was a re-
medial action, there was no need to confront the difficult prob-
lem involved in punishing someone not found to have engaged
in any wrongdoing. 50
Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, noted that the
car belonged to both Mr. Bennis and his wife, and "at all times
he had her consent to use the car, just as she had his."'"' As
a result, the only question that remained was whether Mrs.
Bennis was "entitled not to the car, but to a portion of the pro-
ceeds." 2 Because the abatement proceeding was an "equitable
action", Justice Ginsburg stated that the Court should defer to
144. I& at 1002. (Thomas, J., concurring).
145. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
146. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
147. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
149. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
This is most obviously true if, in stating that there would be little left
over after "costs," the trial judge was referring to the costs of sale. The
court's order indicates that he may have had other "costs" in mind as
well when he made that statement, e.g., law enforcement costs .... Even
if the "costs" that the trial judge believed would consume most of the
sales proceeds included not simply the expected costs ... related to this
particular proceeding, the State would still have a plausible argument
that using the sales proceeds to pay such costs was "remedial" action,
rather than punishment.
Id. at 1002 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
150. See id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
152. Id- (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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the judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan.' She noted
that the trial judge declined to divide the sale of the proceeds
for two practical reasons: 1) the Bennis's had another car; and
2) the value of the forfeited car left almost nothing after sub-
tracting costs.154
E. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Justice
Breyer joined, argued that neither logic nor history supported
the majority's opinion.' Justice Stevens argued that under
the Court's logic, states would have limitless power to confis-
cate vast amounts of property where criminals have engaged in
illegal acts. 6 He stated that the time to confront the limits of
a forfeiture scheme with such expansive potential for applica-
tion had arrived. 7
Justice Stevens focused primarily on the connection between
the forfeited property and the offense committed." Justice
Stevens argued that the Court in recent years has agreed that
the idea of illicit instrumentalities must have a limit, and that
there must be some connection between the crime and the
property other than mere location. 9 He explained that there
are three different categories of property subject to seizure:
pure contraband, proceeds of criminal activity, and tools of the
criminal trade."° The third category, known as "derivative
153. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 'Michigan, in short, has not embarked on
an experiment to punish innocent third parties. Nor do we condone any such experi-
ment. Michigan has decided to deter Johns from using cars they own (or co-own) to
contribute to neighborhood blight, and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this
Court's disapprobation. Id (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
154. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
155. See id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See i&d at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Some 75 years ago, when presented
with the argument that the forfeiture scheme we approved had no limit, we insisted
that expansive application of the law had not yet come to pass. 'When such applica-
tion shall be made,' we said, 'it will be time enough to pronounce upon it. Id. at
1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512
(1921)).
158. See id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Austin v. United states, 509
U.S. 602, 619-20 (1994)).
160. See id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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contraband" and which applied in Bennis, was the most prob-
lematic because "of its potentially far broader sweep" and mini-
mal remedial effect. 6 ' Justice Stevens asserted that although
many of the early cases demonstrate that the law may reason-
ably presume that the owner of property is aware of the princi-
ple use being made of that property, the property in this case
differs from historical precedent.'62 The distinguishing factor,
he stated, was that the car used by Mr. Bennis did not consti-
tute the principle use of an instrumentality of the crime and
the "mobile character of the car played a part only in the nego-
tiation, but not in the consummation of the offense.""8 In ear-
lier cases, he argued, the property actually played a part in
facilitating the offenses.' Specifically relying on Austin, Jus-
tice Stevens argued that the nexus between the car and the
The first category-pure contraband-encompasses items such as
adulterated food, sawed-off shotguns, narcotics, and smuggled goods. With
respect to such 'objects the possession of which, without more, constitutes
a crime,' the government has an obvious remedial interest in removing
the items from public circulation, however blameless or unknowing their
owners may be. The States' broad and well-established power to seize
pure contraband is not implicated by this case, for automobiles are not
contraband.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 699 (1965)).
The second category-proceeds-traditionally covered only stolen
property, whose return to its original owner has a powerful restitutionary
justification. Recent federal statutory enactments have dramatically en-
larged this category to include the earnings from various illegal transac-
tions. Because those federal statutes include protections for innocent
owners, cases arising out of the seizure of proceeds do not address the
question whether the Constitution would provide a defense to an innocent
owner in certain circumstances if the statute had not done so.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The third category includes tools or instrumentalities that a wrong-
doer has used in the commission of a crime, also known as "derivative
contraband." Forfeiture is more problematic for this category of property
than for the first two, both because of its potentially far broader sweep,
and because the government's remedial interest in confiscation is less
apparent.
Id (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 699).
161. Id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 1005-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Goldsmith v. United States,
254 U.S. at 505, 513) (referring to "the adaptability of property to an illegal pur-
pose"); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 465 (noting that transporting liquor is an
element in the statute prohibiting transportation of intoxicating liquor)).
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crime in Bennis is fatally insufficient to support forfeiture.'
He asserted that the car used by John Bennis was simply a
location for a one-time event, effectively no different from the
real property in Austin.'"
Justice Stevens attacked the majority's dismissal of the
Calero-Toledo proposition that reasonable precautions may serve
as a defense, arguing that the Court has consistently recognized
an exception for truly innocent owners.'67 He reasoned that
because Mrs. Bennis had no knowledge that her husband would
commit the illicit act in the car, she cannot be accused of not
taking reasonable precautions to prevent the incident."6 Cit-
ing Austin, Justice Stevens noted that the Court has held that
all of its forfeiture decisions rested "at bottom, on the notion
that the owner has been negligent in allowing his property to
be misused and that he is properly punished for that negli-
gence. " 69 He stated that "[s]he is just as blameless as if a
thief, rather than her husband, had used the car in a criminal
episode." 70
Justice Stevens then addressed his concerns with the exces-
siveness of the forfeiture. 7' He argued that the forfeiture of
Mrs. Bennis' interest in her car violated the limitations of the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause and was "dramati-
cally at odds" with the Courts holding in Austin.'72 He stated
that the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis' interest in the car was exces-
sive because the confiscation of the entire car, simply because
one illicit act took place in the driver's seat, is "out of all pro-
portion with her blameworthiness." 3 Additionally, he rea-
soned, the forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment because of
the disparity between the value of conveyances subject to for-
feiture; the government could not reasonably tie this forfeiture
165. See id at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 1007-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. See id at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Austin v. United states, 509 U.S.
602, 615 (1993)).
170. Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to a remedial end.' 4 He stated that "[u]nder the Court's rea-
soning, the value of the car is irrelevant. A brand-new luxury
sedan or a ten-year-old used car would be equally forfeit-
able.' 75
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, explained that the history of
forfeiture proceedings developed in response to concerns unique-
ly related to admiralty law that are not present today.76 Lack
of culpability was eliminated as a defense for forfeitures only as
a necessity, to derive prompt compensation for injuries done by
a vessel whose owners were often too far away to be reached by
the law.' Justice Kennedy explained that admiralty law can
remain valid without extending it to the automobile in every
analogous instance. 8 He argued that a strong presumption of
negligent entrustment or criminal complicity may be sufficient
"to protect the government's interest where the automobile is
involved in a criminal act in the tangential way that it was [in
Bennis]."79 Justice Kennedy concluded that the forfeiture in
Bennis cannot meet the requirements for due process, because
nothing "indicates that the forfeiture turned on the negligence
or complicity" of Mrs. Bennis.8 9
V. ANALYZING BENNIS V. MICHIGAN
The decision in Bennis was in one sense shocking and in
another sense very pragmatic. The Court was sharply divided,
but the majority correctly concluded that, despite the perceived
hardship imposed on innocent owners, precedent supported
their conclusion.' 8' Critics will be quick to point out that this
decision seems out of touch with the times and offends the
reasonable person's sense of fairness. On its face, the result in
Bennis does not seem equitable. In light of these criticisms, it
again becomes important to note that a truly innocent owner
174. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. See id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. See id at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Harmony v. United States, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844)).
178. See id at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 999.
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still has a defense under Calero-Toledo.5 2 Concerned owners
have the option of refusing to share, lend or lease their proper-
ty to irresponsible persons. Additionally, despite the Austin
Court's refusal to formulate a test for excessiveness, forfeitures
remain limited by the Eighth Amendment."s
A. Liability of the "Innocent Owner"
In Bennis, the Court again relied on the guilty property fic-
tion to impose strict liability." The dissent was content to ig-
nore this fiction because it seemed "fundamentally unfair."'
Justice Thomas pointed out that "one unaware of the history of
forfeiture laws and years of this Court's precedent... might
well assume that such a scheme is lawless."" The Court in
Van Oster stated, "[i]t is not unknown or indeed uncommon for
the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant
consequences of the unauthorized action of one whom he has
entrusted it."' The majority opinion explains that this propo-
sition creates the undesirable, yet necessary effect of placing
liability upon the owner of property.'
The dissent, relying on the reservation in Goldsmith, sought
to import the principle that "forfeiture is inappropriate when
the means to prevent the illicit use cannot be carried out.""
Justice Rehnquist explained that this proposition merely applies
to situations involving theft or robbery.' The dissent, failing
to recognize that Calero-Toledo is still good law, instead asked
182. A truly innocent owner is one who has taken reasonable actions to prevent
illicit use, and has lack of knowledge. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974).
183. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993).
184. See 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996).
185. Id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 998 (quoting Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926)).
188. See id.
189. Id. at 1008 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 347 (1808)).
190. See id. at 999. "But Peisch was dealing with the same question reserved in
Goldsmith-Grant, not any broader proposition: 'If, by private theft, or open robbery,
without any fault on his part, [an owner's] property should be invaded... the law
cannot be understood to punish him with the forfeiture of that property." Id. (quoting
Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 364 (1808)).
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the Court to limit liability and import an element of culpabili-
ty. 9' The Court correctly declined to overrule the "well-estab-
lished" precedent from cases "having at best a tangential rela-
tion to the 'innocent owner' doctrine in forfeiture cases."'
The majority found that this would effectively eliminate the
Government's objective of deterrence, thus rendering forfeitures
powerless.
Recognizing that Calero-Toledo's innocent owner test still
provides a truly innocent owner with a defense, the Court ex-
plained that Mrs. Bennis did not qualify for the protection set
forth by that dicta.'93 Justice Rehnquist stated that there is a
distinction between a situation where an owner does not con-
sent and one in which the owner merely does not consent to a
particular use.' Tina Bennis could not claim she was in the
former situation because John Bennis co-owned the car.'95 The
majority opinion in Bennis makes it clear that simply demon-
strating an owner's lack of knowledge is not enough to show
innocence under Calero-Toledo. The test is narrow, and protects
only an owner who can show that the property was stolen or
otherwise taken without his privity or consent. Tina Bennis was
in the same position as the yacht owner in Calero-Toledo; she
merely proved that she did not take part in or have knowledge
of John Bennis' crime.
B. The "Nexus" Consideration
The Court explained that it is unwilling to base the due
process inquiry on whether the use for which the instrumentali-
ty was forfeited was the principle use. 6 The dissent argued
that the property in Bennis bore no necessary connection to the
offense. 97 This contention is misguided, because, as the ma-
jority explains, it is unsupported by a long line of cases impos-
ing liability on owners in similar circumstances. 8 The Court
191. See id. at 1007-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1000.
193. See id. at 999.
194. See id at 999 n.5.
195. See id at 998.
196. See id at 999-1000.
197. See id. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 998.
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explained that had the due process inquiry depended on the
principal use question, then Calero-Toledo, where only one
marijuana cigarette was found on the entire yacht, may have
been decided differently.' The dissents suggestion that the
Palmyra line of cases "would justify the confiscation of an ocean
liner just because one of its passengers sinned while on
board"2 0 overstates the majority opinion. In response to this
argument, the majority repeated the longstanding Goldsmith
reservation, that "[w]hen such application shall be made it will
be time enough to pronounce upon it."2"' The dissent also ar-
gued that there is no difference between the car in Bennis and
the real property in Austin.0 2 This view ignores the majority's
contention that the car served not only as the locus for the
crime but was also used to facilitate the crime. Again, this rea-
soning is supported by numerous cases."' In Bennis, the ma-
jority clearly viewed the car as an instrumentality of the crime,
and the precedent supports that conclusion. However, the Court
remains unwilling to draw a bright line in this area.2 Justice
Thomas, in his concurring opinion, acknowledged that the limits
on what property is an instrumentality of crime are un-
clear. 05 Because of the lack of definition in this area, he ex-
plained, it is appropriate for the Court to strictly apply the
limits that exist and adhere to historical precedent.2"
Finally, the Court explained that Austin merely answered the
question of whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil
forfeitures. 7 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that there
should be limits placed on the forfeiture of property.20" The
Court stated that the Eighth Amendment does indeed limit
forfeitures, but the question of excessiveness was best left to
199. See id at 999-1000.
200. Id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1000 (quoting Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921)).
202. See id at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505
(1921).
204. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
205. See id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 1000.
208. See id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the discretion of the lower court. 9 The Bennis majority did
not consider the monetary value of the forfeited automobile
substantial enough to warrant limitations. This leaves open the
question of whether the forfeiture of an innocent owner's in-
terest that is substantial may warrant the establishment of
such limits. In Bennis, however, the Court was content to con-
fine Austin to its specific holding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The limits on forfeiture proceedings are narrow, and as Jus-
tice Thomas stated, "it thus seems appropriate ... to apply
those limits rather strictly."10 Although the fiction of guilty
property has lost much of its relevance, the Court in Bennis
continued to recognize the proposition.211 If it were not for
this arcane legal theory, forfeitures would inevitably be ren-
dered unconstitutional." Despite criticism, this fiction does
indeed have a long and venerable history. Critics may have
expected a victory in this area, where the Court has been sensi-
tive to innocent owners since Austin and James Good. When
one factors in the current conservative mode of the Court and a
seemingly unending "war on drugs," however, this decision is
not so surprising."' By adhering to this strict legal standard,
the government is relieved of the burdens that would be im-
209. See id. at 1000.
210. Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
211. See id. at 998. "Cases often arise where the property of the owner is forfeited
on account of the fraud, neglect, or misconduct of those intrusted with its posses-
sion . . . and it has always been held ... that the acts of [the possessors] bind the
interest of the owner ... whether he be innocent or guilty." Id. (quoting Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878)).
212. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1993); see also Lawrence
A. Kasten, Extending Constitutional Protection to Civil Forfeitures That Exceed Rough
Remedial Compensation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 194, 198-99 (1991) (describing com-
mon-law fiction of guilty property).
213. Civil forfeiture statutes are used to fund the "war on drugs." President Bush
stated in 1991 that "[a]sset forfeiture laws allow us to take the ill-gotten gains of
drug kingpins and use them to put more cops on the streets and more prosecutors in
court." Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 275 (1992) (citing President George Bush, Remarks By
President Bush at the Attorney General's Summit on Law Enforcement: Responses to
Violent Crime, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 5, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
FEDNEW File).
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posed on it if a criminal trial was a prerequisite to forfeiture.
The paradoxical result is that civil forfeiture laws permit the
forfeiture of property from owners whom the government con-
cedes are not criminals by definition.
Perhaps one result of Bennis v. Michigan will be to reinforce
the common-law theory used to support forfeitures, leaving the
innocent owner defense subject to the rules put forth in Calero-
Toledo and Austin.214 On the other hand, the decision may al-
so serve to reinvigorate forfeiture reform in the legislature. It
would seem logical that Congress' objective should be to ensure
that civil forfeiture proceedings serve to prevent, rather than
facilitate, such undesirable outcomes. After Bennis, however,
the primary rationale for imposing civil forfeitures remains the
guilty property fiction and all of its unpleasant baggage.
There will always be feelings of injustice when an owner is
deprived of his property without regard to guilt or inno-
cence."' The law in its most fundamental sense is designed to
protect the innocent. But in order to provide the government
with any force with which to use this tool, a strict liability
theory has been and apparently continues to be necessary. 16
"[T]he rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.""
Peter David Houtz
214. The relevant rule of Calero-Toledo is that the owner may have a defense to a
forfeiture action if he can show that he has taken reasonable precautions to prevent
the illicit use of property and that he was not aware of the illicit use. See Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974). The holding of Austin
is that the Eighth Amendment extends to civil proceedings where fines are intended
to punish. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993).
215. "Fundamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people." Bennis v.
Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Gold-
smith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
217. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).

